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Thought experiments are conducted for multiple reasons in the natural sciences, the social sciences as 
well as in philosophy and have been characterized in the philosophical literature in multiple ways 
(Brown 2014). One well-established view is that thought experiments are primarily used in disciplines in 
which observation and experimentation is difficult to realize. One such discipline is economics, where 
the methodological value of thought experiments is frequently justified by referring to the difficulty to 
conduct actual experiments. It has also been argued that there thought experiments serve other 
functions, such as establishing causal facts, isolating tendencies, justifying social institutions and their 
persistence, or bridging the gap between mathematical models and reality (Maas 2014; Reiss 2012). 
 
In this paper, I suggest that thought experiments have long had yet another function in economics. 
Looking more closely at the function of thought experiments in econometrics, I argue that they have 
been employed to bridge the gap between theoretically established relationships and their empirical 
testing via establishing and operationalizing unobservable economic concepts. More specifically, in 
economics thought experiments have allowed for explicating and operationalizing psychological 
concepts, such as utility. They allowed for the justification of the major postulates of human decision 
making that are used as first principles in economic theories. As such, they allowed for measurement of 
the major variables indicating human behaviour in economics and quantifying the major laws in 
economics without actually requiring actual experimentation into human psychology. While observation 
is often not only impossible to specify such psychological concepts, it is frequently also not necessary in 
order to use them in empirical testing. 
 
In support of my argument, I will offer a historical case study, namely the “hypothetical experiments” of 
the Norwegian economist and Nobel laureate, Ragnar Frisch (1895-1973). As I will show, Frisch used this 
specific kind of thought experiments to justify his axioms of the traditional theory of consumer choice in 
his paper Sur un Problme d’Economie Pure (1926), as well as in a series of lectures that he delivered in 
the early 1930s. By drawing upon such experiments, Frisch aimed at eliminating the method of 
introspection, which was a vestige of the Austrian school and from metaphysical commitments through 
the use of psychological concepts such as subjective utility that hindered economics from becoming a 
scientific enterprise according to Frisch. At the same time, he sought to equip economic theories with 
acceptable behavioral foundations from which quantitative economic reasoning could be derived (see 
e.g. Frisch 2010 [1930], p. 82 f.). 
 
In so doing, Frisch followed in the tradition of Irving Fisher and Vilfredo Pareto. While impressed by their 
developments of utility analysis, Frisch aimed at taking one step further towards freeing consumer 
choice theory from psychological concepts, such as utility, while nevertheless arriving at quantitative 
measurements of utility. Towards this end, Frisch used thought experiments to justify the set of choice 
axioms he introduced into consumer choice theory. Thereby, Frisch circumvented the problem of 
directly observing utility via actual experiments without purging the concept of utility from economic 
theory altogether. As such, those thought experiments helped Frisch empirically support the theory’s 
most important implications, such as the laws of demand and supply, without the input of new empirical 
findings. By demonstrating the merits of thought experiments in econometrics, this case study not only 
allows us to draw some more general conclusions about the nature and purpose of thought 
experiments. It also enables us to engage in a more general debate about the justifications of behavioral 
principles in economics, which exists in economics the latest since John Stuart Mill’s introduction of the 
homo economicus and to discuss the usefulness of psychological theories for economics. Economists 
have for a long time been concerned with the question of how they should think about the behavioral 
principles as constitutive elements of their most influential theories about the economy. Thereby, they 
have always abstained from including psychological findings into economic theories and models or from 
testing their principles of human behavior themselves. Contrary to the presuppositions of many 
contemporary critiques of the axiomatic method in economics, the argument is that axioms of 
rationality, which nowadays constitute the conceptual heart of economics were not primarily aimed at 
adequately representing the actual thought processes of the human agent. In contrast, critics of this 
procedure were, and still are, particularly concerned when principles of rational behavior became 
axiomatized; first by Frisch and later by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern. 
 
The case of Frisch’s hypothetical experiments helps us clarify the position of the economists in this 
debate, analyze the status of the rationality axioms in economic theories, and - against this background - 
discuss the recent advances in behavioral economics, i.e. the attempts to introduce a psychologically 
more adequate theory of human behavior into economics; to conduct experiments on human behavior 
in economics; and to draw extensively on psychological concepts and findings. In their function to bridge 
the gap between theory and data, Frisch’s hypothetical experiments offer us a case that enables 
discussion of the question how much psychology is actually needed in economics. 
 
